Mr. Schieber’s second argument against fine-tuning suggests that it could be the case that the universe was fine-tuned for red rocks. This is just a misunderstanding of the argument. This type of pop-objection completely ignores the role of brand new specified and complex information and it’s necessary antecedent being a mind, which is non-controversial and empirically verified. (Such information would be the role of the values of physical constants being balanced to permit life. This could be a macro example. The information content in quantum physics, especially the many worlds interpretation, increases the information content exponentially.) By experience, it can be inferred that mind originates information that the other competing hypotheses do not have the explanatory scope and power as FT does. It is by the means of abduction one can infer that FT is the best explanation for the data. Chance and randomness cannot substantially account for the data. The improbability alone is infinitesimally small. The necessity explanation has no support due to the logical possibility of universes being different then what they actually are.
What is an adequate cause for the effect in question—the origin of cosmic information? Logically, one can infer the past existence of a cause from its effect, when the cause is known to be necessary to produce the effect in question. In the absences of any other known causes then the presence of the effects points unambiguously back to the uniquely adequate cause—a mind.[4] This issue will also address the range of possible values for constants. If physics can be expressed counterfactually then we can certainly derive a random sample by which to compare to some type of background information. The full range of values is not a necessary epistemic component. It’s my suspicion that the greater the range is it inversely increases the probability for the fine-tuning argument to be true.
The possible explanans are mind, phenomenal entities, or abstract entities. The options must meet the conditions of causal efficacy and specificity. The first condition states that origin of information must be causal. Information does not arbitrarily pop in and out of existence but requires a source.[5] The second condition states that the origin must sufficiently explain the specificity in information and must provide more than mere Shannon information.
Consider a computer as an example for information relay (a phenomenal entity). The computer is and can be used as a channel, it can be a receiver, and it can be a source of information. However, to say that the information in the computer no longer needs an explanation for its origin would suffer the problem of information displacement—it pushes the problem back a step in explanation. What begs the question is identifying the source of information in the computer. The answer would inevitably become a software engineer or a programmer. Undirected material processes have not demonstrated the capacity to generate significant amounts of specified information.[6] Information can be changed via materialistic means. The computer can change the initial coding from the programmer and introduce noise on the sending and receiving ends.
Physicists are more likely to affirm the existence of abstract objects because the language of physics serves for the communication of reports and predictions and hence cannot be taken as a mere calculus in some cases. Those physicists who are suspect of the abstract as semantics in reference to real numbers as space-time coordinates or as values, functions, limits, etc.[7] The question present concerning the existence of abstract entities is not whether or not they exist. That’s completely irrelevant to the argument and has a fair place at the table of possibilia. One must not rule out a possible explanation due to ontological insight eliminating options a priori.
The task in evaluating the plausibility of abstract entities as the best explanation for the origin of information is whether it meets the aforementioned conditions of causal efficacy and specificity. With regards to the causal efficacy of abstract entities, what experience could be used as a referent? Certainly, there is meaning behind the phrases, “There are seven cows in the field” or “The apple is red” since these merely commit to the existence of abstract universals. This answers the question of whether abstract objects can specify information. The ability to specify must meet the antecedent condition of causal capacity since the role of causation is analogous to the role of the channel. Information does not originate in the source and arrive at the receiver (physical reality) without a channel. Thus, abstract objects are not sufficient explanations for the origin of information.
Of the possible explanans, mind, phenomenal entities, or abstract entities, the former is the best explanation. Neither phenomenal nor abstract entities are sufficient in accounting for the origin of brand new information. If one wants to appeal to phenomenal or abstract entities then it becomes an issue of information displacement.