Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII(3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
Articles I and II and first and third preambular parairaphs
1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
2. The Conference recalls that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.
3. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
4. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
5. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of States parties to the effective implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty, the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted without a vote, and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference,2 adopted by consensus.
6. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.
7. The Conference emphasized that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State Party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.
8. The Conference recognizes that breaches of the Treaty's obligations undermine nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
9. The Conference condemns with the strongest possible terms the nuclear test explosions carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006 and 2009. The Conference recalls all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon-State.
Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs. especially in their relationship to article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs
10. The Conference reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing 'diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
11. The Conference reaffirms the importance of access to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with Article XII.C. of the Statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the IAEA.
12. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.
13. The Conference recalls paragraph 12 of Decision 2 ("Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament") of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which provides that new supply arrangements for the transfers of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
14. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration so that there is a credible assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
15. The Conference welcomes that 166 States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA in compliance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.
16. The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved additional protocols (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) to comprehensive safeguards agreements for 133 States. Additional protocols are currently being implemented in 102 States.
17. The Conference welcomes that all nuclear-weapon States have now brought into force additional protocols to their voluntary offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol.
18. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that the implementation of measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol provides, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. The Conference notes that numerous States were of the view that those measures have been introduced as an integral part of the IAEA's safeguards system. The Conference also notes that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation.
19. The Conference notes that many States recognize that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols are among the integral elements of the IAEA's safeguards system. The Conference notes that in the case of State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to article III (1) of the Treaty and supplemented by an additional protocol in force, measure contained in both instruments represent the enhanced verification standard. The Conference notes that the additional protocol represents a significant confidence building measure. The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol.
20. The Conference stresses the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements and the IAEA Statute.
21. The Conference welcomes the important work being undertaken by the IAEA in the conceptualization and development of State-level approaches to safeguards implementation and evaluation, and in the implementation of State-level integrated safeguards approaches, which result in an information driven system of verification that is more comprehensive, as well as more flexible and effective. The Conference welcomes the implementation by IAEA of integrated safeguards in 47 States parties.
22. The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards can play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between States, and that they can also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation.
23. The Conference notes the concerns expressed by numerous States parties with respect to matters of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and their calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.
24. The Conference underscores the importance of the IAEA exercising fully its mandate and its authority to verify the declared use of nuclear material and facilities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States parties in with conformity with comprehensive safeguards agreements and where relevant with additional protocols, respectively.
25. The Conference views that the implementation of additional protocols equips the IAEA with efficient and effective tools for obtaining additional information about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference notes that many States were of the view that additional protocols also equip the IAEA with access that provides the basis for credible assurance.
26. The Conference welcomes the efforts of the IAEA to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material.
27. The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the' Treaty, and, for States parties, also fully respecting article IV. The Conference notes that numerous States underline that effective and transparent export controls are important to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which, in the view of those States, depend on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation.
28. The Conference notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. The Conference welcomes the adoption in 2005 of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
29. The Conference emphasizes the important role of the IAEA in fostering international cooperation in nuclear security in establishing a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines, and in assisting Member States, upon request, in their efforts to enhance nuclear security.
30. The Conference recognizes the need for enhanced international cooperation and coordination amongst States parties, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation, in preventing, detecting and responding to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. In this regard, the Conference notes the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States parties to combat such trafficking, including the Agency's activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information an the continued maintenance of its illicit trafficking database.
31. The Conference notes the entry into force in 2007 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Article IV and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs
32. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III and IV of the Treaty. The Conference recognizes that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, the Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.
33. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so should also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
34. The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.
35. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States,' to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. Transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty are to be encouraged. They would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.
36. The Conference underlines the role of the IAEA in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the development of effective and efficient programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological, and regulatory capabilities.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy — Nuclear Energy and Technical Cooperation
37. The Conference emphasizes that cooperation, to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is one of the core objectives enshrined in the IAEA Statute.
38. The Conference positively notes and further encourages States parties' active cooperation, among themselves and through the IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.
39. The Conference underlines that the IAEA's activities in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meet energy needs, improve health, combat poverty, protect the environment, develop agriculture, manage the use of water resources and optimize industrial processes, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.
40. The Conference affirms the importance of public information in connection with peaceful nuclear activities in States parties to help build acceptance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
41. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA, and stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries for the sustaining and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development in areas such as electricity production, human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy and the use of nuclear techniques in environmental protection, water resources management, industry, food, nutrition and agriculture.
42. The Conference stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation (TC) programme, as one of the main vehicles for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA's Statute and guiding principles, as contained in INFCIRC/267, and in accordance with relevant directives of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.
43. The Conference notes the continuous collaborative efforts by the IAEA and its Member States to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's technical cooperation programme.
44. The Conference recognizes that regional cooperative arrangements for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the Technical Cooperation activities of IAEA in individual countries. It notes the contributions of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA), the Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in. Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA), as well as the strategy for the Technical Cooperation Programme in European region.
45. The Conference calls on States parties to make every effort and take practical steps to ensure that the IAEA's resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable (SAP) to meet the objectives mandated in article II of the IAEA Statute, notes with appreciation the 94% Rate of Attainment level by the end of 2009, and looks forward to reaching the rate of 100%, which is central to reconfirming the commitment of IAEA Member States to the IAEA's TC programme, and thus recalls that the financing of TC should be in line with the concept of shared responsibility and that all members share a common responsibility towards financing and enhancing the TC activities of the IAEA.
46. The Conference welcomes the commitment of the IAEA Director General to ensuring that the IAEA's work continues to meet the basic needs of human beings in the fields of, inter alia, human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, water resources, industry, food, nutrition and agriculture and especially the IAEA Director General's initiative to highlight cancer control as a priority for the IAEA during 2010.
47. The Conference welcomes the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities. Such additional resources can contribute to' the achievement of Millennium Development Goals.
48. The Conference supports national, bilateral and international efforts to train the skilled workforce necessary for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Nuclear Power -
49. The Conference acknowledges that each State party has the right to define its national energy policy.
50. The Conference recognizes that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals.
51. The Conference recognizes the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy, as well as the important issue of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste in a sustainable manner, while also recognizing the continuing international efforts to address those issues. Nuclear fuel suppliers are encouraged to work with and assist recipient States, upon request, in the safe and secure management of spent fuel.
52. The Conference recognizes that the development of an appropriate infrastructure to support the safe, secure and efficient use of nuclear power, in line with relevant IAEA standards and guidelines, is an issue of central importance, especially for countries that are planning for the introduction of nuclear power.
53. The Conference confirms that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy should be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, in accordance with IAEA standards and consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.
54. The Conference notes the importance, for countries developing their capacities in this field, of working to further develop and promote advanced nuclear technologies, nationally and through cooperation in all relevant international initiatives such as, inter alia, INPRO, ITER and the Generation IV International Forum.
55. The Conference notes the High Level African Regional Meeting on the Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Peace and Sustainable Development held in Algiers in January 2007, the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century organized by the IAEA in Beijing, China, in April 2009 and the International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy held in Paris, France, in March 2010.
56. The Conference encourages States concerned to further develop a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors.
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
57. The Conference notes the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2009 of the Resolution on establishment in Russia of a reserve of low-enriched uranium for the use of IAEA Member States and the signature in March 2010 of the relevant Agreement between Russia and the IAEA.
58. The Conference underlines the importance of continuing to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of the IAEA, or regional fora, the possibilities to create voluntary multilateral mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle, without affecting rights of States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the Treaty, and while addressing the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues.
Nuclear safety and nuclear security
59. The Conference stresses the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While nuclear safety and nuclear security are national responsibilities, the IAEA should play the key role in the development of safety standards, nuclear security-guidance and relevant conventions based on best practice.
60. The Conference notes that a demonstrated global record of safety is a key element for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that continuous efforts are required to ensure that the technical and human requirements of safety are maintained at the optimal level. Although safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters is important: The Conference encourages the efforts of IAEA, as well as of other relevant fora, in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture. The Conference welcomes and underlines the intensification of national measures and international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste management, including activities conducted in this area by the IAEA. In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and sustained to increase awareness in these fields, through participation of States parties, particularly those from developing countries in training, workshops, seminars and capacity building in a non-discriminatory manner.
61. The Conference acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety of their nuclear installations, and the crucial importance of an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and spent fuel and radioactive waste management, as well as an independent and effective regulatory body.
62. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
63. The Conference endorses the principles and objectives of the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, and underlines the important role of the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
64. The Conference encourages all States that have not done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.
65. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
66. The Conference notes the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010.
67. The Conference welcomes the efforts by State parties on a voluntary basis' to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.
68. 'The Conference recognizes the importance of applying best practice and basic principles, as developed by the IAEA, in mining and processing, including those related to environmental management of uranium mining.
69. The Conference underlines the fundamental importance of sustainable programmes, through international efforts, such as the IAEA, and regional and national efforts, for education and training in nuclear, radiation, transport, waste safety and nuclear security, while focusing on building institutional capacity and technical and managerial capabilities in States parties.
70. The Conference encourages State parties to promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and nuclear security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.
71. The Conference welcomes the attention to problems of safety and contaimination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear-weapons programmes, including where appropriate, safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas.
72. The Conference encourages all governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in these affected areas, while noting the efforts that have been made to date in this regard.
Safe transport of radioactive materials
73. The Conference recognizes that, historically, the safety record of civilian transport, including maritime transport, of radioactive materials has been excellent, and stresses the importance of international cooperation to maintain and enhance the safety of international transport.
74. The Conference reaffirms maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments.
75. The Conference endorses the IAEA standards for the safe transport of radioactive material and affirms. that it is in the interests of all States parties that the transportation of radioactive materials continue to be conducted consistent with international standards of safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines. The Conference takes note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transportation of radioactive materials by sea and, in this regard, welcomes efforts to improve communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
Armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes
76. The Conference considers that attacks or threats of attack on nucleaar facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The Conference notes that a majority of States parties have suggested a legally binding instrument be considered in this regard.
77. The Conference recalls the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Brussels Convention supplementary to the Paris Convention, the Joint Protocol Related to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention and the protocols amending these conventions, and the objectives thereof, and noting also the intention of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage to establish a worldwide nuclear liability regime based on the principles of nuclear liability law, without prejudice to other liability regimes.
78. The Conference recognizes the importance of having in place effective and coherent nuclear liability mechanisms at the national and global levels to provide compensation, if necessary, for damage inter alia to people, property and the environment due to a nuclear accident or incident, taking fully into account legal and technical considerations, and believing that the principle of strict liability should apply in the event of a nuclear accident or .incident, including during the transport of radioactive material. (Source: GC(53)/RES/10)
79. The Conference affirms that the provisions of article V of the Treaty as regards the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty.
Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs
80. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish, in accordance with the principle of irreversibility, the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.
81. The Conference, while welcoming achievements in bilateral and unilateral reductions by some nuclear-weapon States, notes with concern that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to several thousands. The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons.
82. The Conference notes the new proposals and initiatives from Governments and civil society related to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The Conference notes the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to inter alia consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.
83. The Conference affirms that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of States parties believe should include specified timelines.
84. The Conference reaffirms the essential role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty within the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, the Treaty combats both horizontal and vertical proliferation. The Conference calls, on all States to refrain from any action which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty pending its entry into force, in particular as regards to the development of new types of nuclear weapons.
85. The Conference welcomes that 181 States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and that 151 States, including 35 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited instruments of ratifications. In this respect, the Conference welcomes the ratification by the Central African Republic and by Trinidad and Tobago during the Conference and welcomes the recent expressions by remaining States whose ratifications are necessary for the. Treaty to enter into force of their intention to pursue and complete the ratification process, including by Indonesia and the United States of America. The Conference also welcomes the recent expression by Iraq, Papua New Guinea and Thailand of their intentions to pursue and complete the ratification process.
86. The Conference welcomes the high-level political support for the Treaty expressed during the Conference on Facilitating the Entry in Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in New York in September 2009, in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty, where specific and practical measures to promote the entry into force of the Treaty were adopted. The Conference stresses the importance of the International Monitoring System and commends the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization towards its completion.
87. The Conference notes the need for further progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.
88. The Conference, while welcoming the adoption by consensus a Programme of Work in the Conference on Disarmament in May 2009, expresses deep concern that after more than a decade the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to commence negotiations and substantive deliberations pursuant to an agreed programme of work and urges it to begin work without delay.
89. The Conference notes the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.
90. The Conference welcomes the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as well as the unilateral reductions measures announced and implemented by other nuclear-weapon States, including the closing and dismantling of nuclear weapons-related facilities. The Conference also welcomes the reductions announced by some nuclear-weapon States in the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, as well as statements by some nuclear-weapon States regarding measures related to strengthening negative security assurances, and notes that China maintains a declaratory policy based on the no-first use of nuclear weapons.
91. The Conference recognises that reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons and announced measures related to de-targeting contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament through the enhancement of confidence-building measures and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.
92. The Conference welcomes the declared moratoria by some nuclear-weapon States on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
93. The Conference notes the regular reports submitted by States parties within the framework of the strengthened review process on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
94. The Conference notes the first meeting between nuclear-weapon States on confidence building measures in the context of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation held in September 2009
95. The Conference notes the increased transparency of some nuclear-weapon States with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in their national inventories and encourages all nuclear-weapon States to provide additional transparent in this regard.
96. The Conference welcomes efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world: The Conference notes the cooperation between Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in establishing a system for nuclear warhead dismantlement verification.
97. The Conference underscores the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States
98. The Conference reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
99. The Conference reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
100. The Conference welcomes the steps that have been taken since 2005 to conclude nuclear-weapon-freezone treaties and recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty are making towards attaining the objective of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
101. The Conference welcomes the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status and supports the measures taken by Mongolia to consolidate and strengthen this status.
102. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty on 15 July 2009. The Conference also welcomes actions by different nuclear-weapon-free zones to pursue their objectives, in particular the plan of action for the period 2007-2012 endorsed by the South East Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone Commission to strengthen the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty and the ongoing consultations between ASEAN and nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
103. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty on 21 March 2009. The Conference considers that the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia constitutes an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the environmental rehabilitation of the territories affected by radioactive contamination. The Conference urges the States concerned to resolve any outstanding issues regarding functioning of the Central Asian NuclearWeapon-Free Zone in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines.
104. The Conference welcomes the ratification of some nuclear-weapon States of Protocols to nuclearweapon-free zone treaties and the announcement of the United States of America of its intention to start the process aimed at the ratification of the protocols to the African and South Pacific NuclearWeapon-Free Zones and the intention to conduct the consultations with the parties to the nuclear weapons-free zones in Central and South East Asia, in an effort to sign and ratify relevant protocols. The Conference stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapons-free zones in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.
105. The Conference underscores the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East.
106. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to bring into effect the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols.
107. The Conference welcomes the results of the First Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones held on 28 April 2005 in Mexico City and the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia held on 30 April 2010 in New York as an important contribution to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference also welcomes the vigorous efforts made by States parties and signatories to those Treaties in order to promote their common objectives. The Conference encourages fostering cooperation and enhanced consultation mechanisms among the existing nuclear weapon-free zones through the establishment of concrete measures in order to fully implement the principles and objectives of the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and to contribute to the implementation of the Treaty regime. The Conference acknowledges the initiative to hold a meeting of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and States having declared their nuclear-weapon-free status within the framework of the forthcoming Review Conferences of the Treaty.
South Asia and other regional issues
108. The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions and promptly. The Conference further urges both States to strengthen their nonproliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
109. The Conference affirms that the situation with respect to the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea constitutes a threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the entire international community, and pose a critical challenge to the global non-proliferation regime.
Further Strengthening the Review Process of the NPT
110. The Conference reaffirm the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decisions of the 2000 Review Conference and the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In the context of the latter, mindful of the undertaking that "Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality", the Review Conference takes the following decisions and recommendations:
111. The Conference recognizes the importance of ensuring optimal coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle. In this context, the Conference encourages the past and incumbent Chairs to be available for consultations by the incoming Chair, if necessary, regarding practical matters relating to their responsibilities. Participation in these meetings will be voluntary ad without affecting the costs assessed to States parties.
112. The Conference recommends that a dedicated staff officer to support the Treaty's review cycle should added to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The dedicated officer will function in an independent manner and be responsible to the meetings of States parties to the Treaty. Pending a •further decision b y States parties, the costs associated with the staff officer will be funded from voluntary contributions from States parties in a position to do so. Such voluntary contributions will be provided without any conditions. The mandate and function of this officer will be reviewed in the next review cycle.
113. The Review Conference affirmed that improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process in an ongoing responsibility of States parties and therefore in this regard, deserves further consideration in the next review cycle.
114. The Conference welcomes the accessions to the Treaty of Cuba in 2002 and Timor-Leste in 2003, the continued adherence of Serbia to the Treaty as per the successor statement of 29 August 2001, as well as the succession of Montenegro in 2006, bringing the total number of States that have become parties to the Treaty to 190, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.
115. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty is vital in promoting nuclear disarmament, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in providing significant security benefits. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty can achieve this goal, and it calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to it without further delay and without any conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, and Additional Protocols consistent with the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). The Conference also calls on those three States, operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear-weapon development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
116. The Conference reaffirms that the preservation of the integrity of the treaty, achieving its universality and its strict implementation is essential to regional and international peace and security.
117. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of parties to the treaty to achieve its universality. States parties express their concern regarding the lack of progress in the achievement of universality and in the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which a majority of States parties believe seriously undermines the treaty and represents a threat to regional and international peace and security.
118. The Conference reaffirms that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
119. The Conference reaffirms that each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. The Conference also reaffirms that pursuant to article X notice of such withdrawal shall be given to all other parties of the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance, and that such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
120. The Conference notes that numerous States recognize that the right of withdrawal is established in the provisions of the NPT. There were divergent views regarding its interpretation with respect to other relevant international law. The Conference notes that many States underscore that under international law a withdrawing party is still responsible for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal, and that if done in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, such withdrawal would not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to withdrawal, including those related to the required IAEA safeguards.
121. Without prejudice to the legal consequences of the withdrawal and to the status of compliance by the withdrawing State, the Conference notes that numerous States were of the view that States parties should undertake consultations immediately, as well as regional diplomatic initiatives. Given the particular circumstances envisaged in article X for the exercise of the right to withdraw, the Conference notes that numerous States reaffirm the responsibility entrusted to the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations.
122. The Conference notes that numerous States acknowledge that nuclear supplying States can consider incorporating dismantling and/or return clauses in the event of the withdrawal, in arrangements or contracts concluded with other State parties as appropriate in accordance with international law and national legislation.